juries to, or the death of, any of its employees, such employee shall not be held to have assumed the risks of his employment in any case where the violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee.”
What was intended to be accomplished by the enactment of the act? Was it intended in some measure to be a benefit and protection to employees who received injury in the course of employment and in what manner, if any, has it affected the defense of the assumption of risk? In Boldt v. Pennsylvania Railway Co., 245 U. S. 445, 38 Sup. Ct. 140, G2 L. ed. 385, it is said that—
‘“At common law the rule is well settled that a servant assumes extraordinary risks incident to his employment or risks caused by the master’s negligence which are obvious or fully known and appreciated by him. Shearman & Redfield on Negligence (6th ed.) § 208; Bailey, Personal Injuries (2d ed.) § 385. This general doctrine was clearly recognized in Gila Valley & Railway Co. v. Hall, 232 U. S. 94, 101; Jacobs v. Southern Railroad Co., supra; Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. De Atley, 241 U. S. 310, 313; and Erie Ry. Co. v. Purucker, 244 U. S. 320, 324.” Assuming that statement to be correct, the servant, in addition to assuming the extraordinary risks incident to his employment necessarily must have assumed the ordinary ones. As we view the following decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States: Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Horton, 233 U. S. 493, 503, 34 Sup. Ct. 635, 58 L. ed. 1062, LL. R.-A. 191§C, 1, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 475, and Jacobs v. Southern Ry. Co., 241 U. S. 229, 235, 36 Sup. Ct. 588, 60 L. ed. 970—notwithstanding the act, the defense of assumption of risk still remains as at common law except as affected by § 4 of the act, supra.
In the Horton Case it is stated:
“It seems to us that § 4, in eliminating the defense of the assumption of risk in the cases indicated, quite plainly evidences the legislative intent that in all other cases such assumption shall have its former effect as a complete bar to the action.”
It would seem from these decisions and others by the same court, to which reference has heretofore been made and by other decisions of that court not here cited, that it has construed the act to mean about as follows, viz.: That it abrogates the fellow-servant rule and the defense of contributory negligence; that the act does not abrogate the common-law principle of the assumption of risk, except where the carrier violates
