with the rule announced in the McGinnis Case, supra. The widow, not only could reasonably expect that the deceased during the 20 years of his life expectancy would have contributed as much as he had theretofore contributed, but she might also reasonably expect him to contribute more, and she could also reasonably expect that in addition to what he directly contributed he would accumulate and save for her the remainder of his net earnings; that is what would be reasonably expected of the average man who had the interest of his family at heart, and the evidence sufficiently discloses that the deceased was this kind of man.
Nardella, prior to and at the time of receiving the injury which caused his death, was an employee of the Northern Pacific Railway Company, on its main line in the capacity of a section man, and in the discharge of his duties was required, among other things, to work upon the yard tracks of the railroad company’s yards at Mandan, and was engaged in removing snow from the crossing where the street of the city crossed the yard tracks. The main and the yard tracks were instrumentalities for transporting both interstate and intrastate commerce. His duty was to repair the tracks and discharge other duties to facilitate interstate as well as intrastate commerce, and he was discharging those duties when killed; and this without regard to the character of the particular cars—interstate or intrastate—which struck and killed him. We are of the opinion, therefore, that when killed he was engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the federal Employers’ Liability Act. Pedersen v. Delaware, L. & W. Ry. Co., 229 U. S. 146, 33 Sup. Ct. 648, 57 L. ed. 1125, Ann. Cas 1914C, 153; Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. Di Donat6, 256 U. S. 327, 41 Sup. Ct. 516, 65 L. ed.—.
We do not feel that we should consider at length any of the other assignments of error. We have given them all careful consideration, and there are none that amount to prejudicial reversible error. The evidence is sufficient to support the verdict. The order and judgment appealed from are affirmed. Respondent is entitled to his statutory costs and disbursements on appeal.
Robinson, J., concurs.
Bronson, J. (specially concurring). I concur in the affirmance of the judgment. This is the second time this case has been before this
