paid by the plaintiff on the Prosser mortgage, has increased from $18,517.50 on October 1, 1918, to $20,483.74 on December 1, 1920. The court also finds that defendant is in default to the extent of 39 1/2 bushels of wheat out of the crop of 1920; further that, if the defendant is unable to make good the defaults on or before September 15, 1921, he may retain one-half of the crops raised upon the land in 1921, upon payment of all expenses, excepting one-half of the thresh bill, and delivery of plaintiff's remaining share in the elevator.
As conclusions of law the trial court determined that the defendant was in default by reason of the failure to pay taxes and interest on the mortgage and to deliver wheat out of the crop of 1920; that the plaintiff was entitled to retain the property and money received as his damages under the contract; that the plaintiff was entitled to one-half of the 1921 crop less one-half of the thresh bill; that the plaintiff should do what was necessary towards renewing the Prosser mortgage, and to that extent the contract was reformed; that the defendant was entitled to make good the defaults on or before September 15, 1921; otherwise that plaintiff should have immediate possession and should be fully reinvested with all title. Pursuant to such findings, judgment was entered on August 19, 1921.
On September 14, 1921, upon application of the defendant, reciting his inability to make good the defaults by reason of inability to thresh, the court granted an extension of time until October 5th and a stay of execution. Again, on October 3d, upon a similar application by the defendant for an extension of time in order to enable him to complete threshing, haul, and market the grain, the trial court extended the time within which to make good the defaults until Octo 20, 1921. On October 26, 1921, upon application of the plaintiff showing failure of the defendant to perform the conditions of the judgment, the trial court ordered judgment to be made final and defendant's interest in the land and right of redemption absolutely at an end.
The defendant contends that the complaint alleges, and the plaintiff has elected to state, a cause of action for rescission and cancellation; that, accordingly, the plaintiff, pursuant to his election, cannot rescind the contract and retain the benefits derived; that the trial court erred in entering a judgment of foreclosure; that the plaintiff, by accepting $907.25 on December 1, 1920, and the crop of 1920, waived the right to insist on foreclosure for the defaults then existing; that no notice of
