section are many other extensive powers not necessary here to set forth in detail.
Under § 21, while the title of all school buildings, sites, lots, furniture, books, apparatus and appurtenances is vested in the city of Fargo, it is so vested to be exclusively used for school purposes; any of such school property could not be levied upon or sold on any process issued on a judgment against the city. In other words, as we construe that section, the city of Fargo holds the naked legal title of the school property for the exclusive use and benefit of the schools and the school system of Fargo.
We think it is clear not only from the provisions of § 7, supra, but from the provisions as well of other sections to which reference above has been made, that the board of education of the city of Fargo is a body corporate, and as such is exclusively charged with the control and management of all the school property of Fargo, and has full and complete dominion over it, and power to deal with it as hereinbefore mentioned, and, this being true, if plaintiff has any cause of action by reason of the matter stated in her complaint, it is not against the city of Fargo, but against the board of education, and we think the complaint so shows.
We are not called upon in this case to determine whether plaintiff has a cause of action against the board of education. It will be time enough to determine that question when it reaches here, if it ever does. If it should be presented, it will present several important legal questions for decision, not necessary here to mention.
We are of the opinion that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and that it further shows that the defendant is not a proper party to the action, and that the demurrer interposed is broad enough to include both of these grounds of demurrer. We are further of the opinion that the trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrer. Its order in that respect is affirmed. Defendant is entitled to his costs and disbursements on appeal. The case is remanded to the district court, and it is directed to enter an order of dismissal of the action.
Birdzell, Christianson, Robinson, and Bronson, JJ., concur.
