they cannot be bound by the statute, nevertheless it is a rule of law well established by the decisions that it must be taxed in the city or town in which the bank is located. McHenry v. Downer, 116 Cal. 20, 47 Pac. 779, 45 L. R. A. 737. This case states the true rule, which is that bank stock is taxable in the city or town where the bank is located. See note to this case for a lengthy discussion of the whole subject. Hence it seems clear that all bank stock on its valuation as ascertained under chap. 61 is taxed locally, and at the local rate of taxation. In other words, it is taxed just the same as a local stock of goods, machinery, a herd of horses or cows, or any other local property is taxed. This, however, is not true of the property mentioned in chap. 230. By the provisions of that law the property therein mentioned is to be listed for the purpose of taxation under the provisions of § 2095, which provides that the capital stock and franchises of corporations and persons shall be listed in the county, town or district where the principal office or place of business of such corporation or person is located in this state; and, if there be no such principal office or place of business, then personal property pertaining to the business of a merchant or manufacturer or corporation shall be listed in the town or district where the business is carried on. Thus the legislature, in the enactment of chaps. 61 and 230, clearly distinguishes banking corporations from all other corporations.
The majority opinion, in endeavoring to show there is no inconsistency between chaps. 61 and 230, which, as we have seen, were both enacted at the same time at the 1917 legislative session, contains the following:
“Chap. 59 of the laws of the same session, which was also approved on the same day, provides a classification scheme by virtue of which bank stock falls in the class subjected to the highest valuation. Class 1 reads in part: ‘All land, town and city lots, railroads, bank stock, express and telegraph property shall constitute class 1,’ etc. And in providing for class 3 we find this language: ‘All household goods, and household equipment and wearing apparel, structures and improvements upon farm land, stocks other than banks, bonds, money and credits, provided that such stocks, bonds, money and credits are not otherwise assessed under a mill or flat rate law, shall constitute class 3,’” etc.
Continuing the majority opinion states as follows:
“Clearly the legislature was impressed with the desirability of dis-
