and impartial trial. The negligence complained of has been estab- lished by an abundance of evidence.
Bronson, J., (dissenting). It is difficult indeed to ascertain upon what grounds the majority opinion grants a new trial. This opinion determines that no error was committed in denying the motion for a directed verdict. It admits a meritorious cause of action for submission to the jury. The cause was submitted for a special verdict upon twenty-seven questions. There is no complaint made in the majority opinion that the jury did not answer intelligently this multitude of questions, or that it was in any manner misled by reason of the instructions of the court or the actions of plaintiff’s counsel. Neither is it pointed out in any manner that the verdict is excessive or that prejudice to the rights of the defendant occurred. The statement of the pleadings and the principal provisions of the law upon which reliance is placed for recovery, as stated by the court to the jury, are not determined in the majority opinion to be cause for reversal. The majority opinion, however, finds that, in connection with the failure of the court to instruct on the measure of damages, plaintiff’s counsel made an unwarranted argument to the jury thereupon. It appears, however, that the court admonished the jury concerning this argument, and further that the defendant has not specified such as error in the assignments of error. Furthermore, the defendant made no motion for a new trial. The majority opinion states that, in the interest of justice, a new trial should be awarded. As a platitude, this is fine sentiment; but, as a reason for reversing a meritorious cause of action where no prejudice, bias, or specific error are shown, it serves, in my opinion, to bring orderly administration of justice into disrepute. This reversal, in this case, is not based on the reception, improperly, of evidence; practically it is based upon the action of the court’s officers, namely, the trial judge and plaintiff’s counsel. The thought apparently is that this jury, to whom was submitted proper evidence for its consideration, and who were required to, and did fully, answer twenty-seven questions concerning this evidence, were unfairly or improperly influenced by the trial court in stating to them too much concerning the pleadings and some general propositions of law, and too little concerning the measure of damages. In my opinion, the reversal in this case is based purely on technical procedural grounds. It discredits the intelligence
