NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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of assets, the MAAF may approve end item requests based on their limited asset data when in reality they may be in long supply, or vice versa.
A further complication to the end item inventory problem is contained in the Memorandum of Understanding between the US and tho French with relation to the $385 million aid program to the Associated States. The Memorandum permits expenditures for armament, motorized equipment, communications equipment and engineering equipment for the Associated States out of the $385 million. It is estimated that $70 million will be for materiel, which will not be controlled by the MAAG. Thus, if the MAAG rejects a request for MDAP aid, there is nothing to prevent Associated States from procuring that item out of the $385 million program. Furthermore, the MAAG would have, if the present state of logistical confusion continues, no information as to the materiel on order from the $385 million or that which is stocked as a result of tho $385 million.
RECOMMENDATIONS: The MAAG immediately bring their records up to date in relation to what equipment and supplies have actually been shipped to Indochina under all programs and what is planned to be ะhipped by date. This will necessitate complete cooperation of all Department of Defense agencies in the US and France with MAAG Saigon.
A request be made to tho French to furnish to tho MAAG ถ11 known assets, including materiel from France, off-shore procurement and materiel to be procured from tho $385 million Associated States aid program. These stated assets, in turn, must be reconciled with the MAAG records in order to provide a firm basis for computing future requirements.
CONSUMPTION: The latest information available to the MAAG on actual consumption is contained in a French report dated April 1953 for the calendar year 1952 which does not take account of the major increased effort since that period. When consumption information is furnished to the MAAG it is usually on a crash basis for tho purpose of justifying air lift of additional supplies. Experience has shown that the French are requesting materiel on a crash basis when they actually have sufficient quantities in their own depots but say it is much easier to have tho US air lift additional quantities than to redistribute the materiel within Indochina. This is particularly true in the case of ammunition. Sometime during the month of April, the French will submit another list of consumption factors, but those will be based on CY 1953 and will not reflect the full impact of the Navarre Plan or the present fighting at Dien Bien Phu.
RECOMMENDATION: That the French be requested to provide experienced consumption rates on all types of equipment and supplies on a monthly recurring basis, or whatever basis is reasonable within their capability.
STOCK LEVELS - OPERATIONAL RESERVE: Inasmuch as the assets, consumption and receipts are more or less unknown, it is no possible for the MAAG to determine what stock levels or operational reserves are being maintained in depots, nor tho amount of equipment in the hands of troops. There are
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