This page needs to be proofread.
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
| Page | ||
| had been clear from the start that "we were not willing to make a commitment ahead of time which the French could use for internal political maneuvering or negotiating at Geneva.…" TEDUL 178, 9 June 1954 | 550 | |
| 133. | "General Ely has twice in my presence stated that his keenest desire is for the United States to enter this war." The purpose of General Valluy's statement (war assessment) is either to bring the U.S. and five other powers into the conflict or to prepare an "excuse before history" for an armistice. Saigon 274 to Dulles, 10 June 1954 | 552 |
| 134. | The French military feel that a Tonkin decision will rest on U.S. intentions. The French are reluctant to request "internationalization" which would result in new talks and provoke new "hopes." The U.S., on the other hand, does not want to consider a U.S. training mission separate from the "overall operational plan" on the assumption the conditions are fulfilled for U.S. participation in Indochina. Murphy (Acting SecState) 4508 to Paris, 10 June 1954 | 553 |
| 135. | The French impression is that even after all conditions are met, the chances of U.S. participation are "nil." With this attitude it is only a matter of time until the French cone to terms with the Viet Minh. The result would be disastrous to French public opinion and the "U.S. would be blamed" for having failed in the crisis. Therefore, it is recommended that the French be informed that "the President is no longer prepared to request military intervention" even if France fulfills all conditions. France should strive for an armistice and thus avoid a military disaster. A few months delay in communist takeover in Indochina is not commensurate with "possible collapse of the defense of Western Europe." Paris 48141 to Dulles, 14 June 1954 | 555 |
| 136. | The French want, and "in effect have, an option on our intervention, but they do not want to exercise it and the date of expiry of out option is fast running out." TEDUL 197, 14 June 1954 | 558 |
| 137. | Secretary Dulles emphasizes that events have shown that predictions he has made all along on the lack bf any real French desire for U.S. intervention but "as a card to play at Geneva." The U.S. does not see that France's bitterness is justified considering "prolonged French and U.K. indecision." Dulles 4579 to Paris, 14 June 1954 | 559 |
xxiii
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
