NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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French Union forces do not as a general rule attempt to gain and maintain contact with the enemy, but rather, they wait for the Viet Minh to attack. Patrolling is the exception rather than the rule. Viet Minh regular battle corps troops have been avoided unless the French troops are well dug in behind barbed wire or have astronomical odds in their favor.
Night operations are never employed by French Union forces although the Viet Minh use such operations most successfully. French forces retire to their fortified and secured areas at nightfall, and control only the areas of their fields of fire. Night operations training should be instituted and emphasized in their training programs, and French Union forces should be as adopt and successful in such operations as the enemy.
At present there is no evidence that the French staff is working off-detailed plans for the final offensive which General Navarre has indicated to me as Chief MAAG will occur during the next dry season, 1954-55.
Although Navarre demands that his requirement for U.S. equipment should not be challenged by this MAAG, the fact is that the small inadequate French staff handling this function is not capable of accurately presenting requirements for Indochina. Were it not for the screening which these requests undergo by MAAG, material would be wastefully supplied, and many critical and sudden shortages would occur. Many examples of this lack of planning foresight can be found in the files of this MAAG, such as requests for specialized equipment requiring specially trained operators with no comp anion plan to provide such operators -- request for a specific amount of ammunition in January is constitute a year, supply only to double the request in April — not because of an oversight or error but because of poor planning for the operations to occur during the intervening months.
This lack of French staff capability and to a great extent the conservative and defensive attitude of the entire theater of operations, is due in large measure to the fact that many of the officers on duty in this theater are over age in grade according to U.S. standards, and are lacking in drive and imagination. Lack of command supervision is obvious in all echelons, the best evidence of which is the absence of command inspections and maintenance inspections of equipment of commanders. End-use inspections by members of this MAAG frequently reveal that higher commanders have never made an inspection of equipment in their subordinate units. Shortage of personnel is another contributing factor which cannot be overcome except through more extensive support from metropolitan France.
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