NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
7. Regarding the French request for 400 mechanics trained in the maintenance of B-26 and C-47 aircraft, there was considerable discussion. Admiral Radford said he had informed General Ely, through General Valluy, that the U.S. does not believe the French have exhausted all efforts to get French civilian maintenance crews. He suggested the French try to find them through "Air France." Mr. Kyes mentioned the possibility of obtaining French personnel from their eight aircraft factories or from the big Chatearoux maintenance base where the U.S. employed French mechanics. General Smith inquired about the possibility off lowering French NATO commitments to enable transfer of French military mechanics. Admiral Radfor said General Valluy had informed him the French staff have carefully considered the idea but the French Air Force does not have enough military mechanics trained in B-26 or C-47 maintenance to fill the requirement. Therefore, there would be such a delay while their military mechanics were being trained on these aircraft that the urgent requirement could tot be met. He had also said that the employment of French civilian mechanics presented a difficult problem in security clearance.
8. General Smith recommended that the U.S. send 200 U.S. Air Force mechanics to MAAG Indochina, and tell the French to provide the rest. Admiral Radford said this could be done and that the Air Force is, somewhat reluctantly, making plans to this end. He had let the French know that if American mechanics were sent they must be used only on air bases which were entirely secure from capture. General Smith wondered, in light of additional French requests, if the Committee should not consider sending the full 400 mechanics.
9. Mr. Kyes questioned if sending 200 military mechanics would not so commit the U.S. to support the French that we must be prepared eventually for complete intervention, including use or U.S. combat forces. General Smith said he did rot think this would result — we were sending maintenance forces not ground forces. He felt, however, that the importance of wining in Indochina was so great that if worst came to the worst he personally would favor intervention with U.S. air and navel forces — not ground forces. Admiral Radford agreed. Mr. Kyes felt this consideration was so important that it should be put to the highest level. The President himself should decide. General Smith agreed. Mr. Allen Dulles wondered if our preoccupation with helping to win the battle at Dien Bien Phu was so great that we were not going to bargain with the French as we supplied their most urgent needs. Mr. Kyes said this was an aspect of the question he was raising. Admiral Radford read from a cable just received from General O'Daniel which indicated General Navarre had been most cordial to General O'Daniel at their meeting and had indicated he as pleased with the concept of U.S. liaison officers being assigned to his general headquarters and to the training command. General Navarre and General O'Daniel agreed to try to work out a maximum of collaboration at the military level.
10. Later in the meeting, Mr. Allen Dulles raised the question as to sending the CAP pilots the French had once requested. It was agreed that
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