Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-3b.djvu/8

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

 

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

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68.	NSC Action No. 1074–A considers the problem of determining the circumstances, conditions, and. extent to which the U.S. should commit it its resources to save Indochina. The problem involves four issues: (1) the prospect of loss of Indochina; (2) the risks, requirements, and consequences of intervention; (3) desirability and form of U.S. intervention; and (4) the timing and circumstances of intervention. NSC Action 1074–A, 5 April 1954	298
69.	The U. S . Army position on intervention in Indochina cites the military disadvantages of such action. Specifically, the Army views are that air and naval forces alone cannot assure victory; that atomic weapons do not reduce the number of ground troops required; that at least seven U. S. divisions with air and naval support are required to win if the French withdraw and the Chinese do not intervene; and that the equivalent of twelve U. S. divisions are required if the Chinese intervene. Army Position on NSC Action No. 1074-A (undated)	332
70.	The President's Special Committee studies the problem to secure the defeat of Communism and establish a "Western oriented complex" in Southeast Asia without resort to overt combat operations by U. S. forces. The report recommends implementation of courses of action previously recommended by the JCS (i. e., augment the French Air Force, assign CIA officials to Indochina, and allocate additional funds to Indochina); and that selective political, military, and psychological steps be taken as a matter of priority (i. e., expand MAAG, expand use of U.S. covert assets in unconventional warfare field, develop foreign information campaign, etc.). Part I, "Indochina" to the President's Special Committee Report on Southeast Asia (undated)	333
71.	The President's Special Committee submits recommendations concerning longer range policy and courses of action for possible future contingencies in Southeast Asia not covered by NSC 5405. It is recommended that the U. S. accept nothing short of military victory, oppose a negotiated settlement at Geneva, pressure the Associated States to continue the war with U. S. support even if negotiations succeed, and seek participation of other nations. Regardless of the outcome of current operations in Indochina, the U. S. in all prudence should develop a regional defense posture incorporating all the Southeast Asian states. Part II, Special Committee Report on Southeast Asia, 5 April 1954	346

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