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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

position that since January 28, Hanoi had repeated that bombing was the first obstacle to talks. Thant said Hanoi's averred willingness to talk after a bombing halt recognized the positions of its allies.

AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG replied that the US was ready to stop bombing if assured such a move would be answered by "appropriate de-escalation on the other side." (New York Times, 12 May) Mr. Goldberg spoke the following day in Chicago. He asked five questions to which the US required answers before ceasing air raids: what would the US and Hanoi talk about; would proposals of both sides be discussed; would talks be negotiations, not merely a demand for US surrender; how would Hanoi militarily reciprocate the cessation of bombing; what assurances would exist that neither side gained by the other's de-escalation. Goldberg also observed that American and North Vietnamese goals were most divergent on the third of Hanoi's four points: the US could not agree that the NLF be recognized but Saigon ignored in peace talks, he said. (US/UN Press Release 54, 12 May)

The DRV and the 1~F scored US military movement into the DMZ on 21 and 22 May. The Front called the introduction of troops into the southern part of the Zone "an extremely serious step of war escalation...an attempt to set up a no-man's land along the provisional military demarcation line and prepare for a new aggressive ground atta ck against the DRV." The Front said this "utterly sabotaged the stature of the demilitarized zone and the Geneva agreements on Vietnam." The DRV statement added the implication that" this action was more evidence of the "deceitful and impudent" nature of the "so-called peace efforts of the US Administration." (VNA, 21 and 23 May) Peking's equally vitriolic statement ended with a declaration of China's willingness"...to take all necessary action" to assist the Vietnamese repel US aggression. (NCNA, 23 May)

On 23 May, a 24-hour cease-fire in honor of Buddha's Birthday was observed. The GVN initially proposed the truce on 8 April and offered to meet with representatives of North Vietnam to discuss its extension. The National Liberation Front then called for a 48-hour truce, claiming this to be the original offer. Representatives of opposing sides did not meet; the truce was not extended.

July 1967

DRV Foreign Minister TRINH reaffirmed his January formula in an interview with a Vienna Volkstimme reporter (2 July). Trinh said

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