Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
IV. South' Vietnam's Four Points (22 June 1965)
- Subversion and military activities undertaken, directed and supported by outside forces must cease. Communist puppet organizations in SVN must be dissolved. Communist troops, political and military cadres must be withdrawn from SVN.
- SVN must be left alone, to choose and shape for itself its own destiny.
- When aggression has ceased, GVN will ask friendly countries to withdraw their forces from SVN, subject to recall in case of renewed aggression.
- Independence and liberty of Vietnamese people must be effectively guaranteed.
V. Ambassador Goldberg to UNGA (22 September 1966)
- U.S. wants a political, not military, solution to the vietnam conflict.
- Reunification should be decided through "free choice by the peoples of both North and South without outside interference."
- U.S. remains ready to negotiate with Hanoi without any prior conditions.
- U.S. will order cessation'of all bombing of NVN the "moment we are assured, privately or otherwise, that this step will be answered promptly by corresponding and appropriate de-escalation on the other side."
- U.S. does not intend to establish a .permanent military presence in Vietnam; U.S. is ready to withdraw its forces as others withdraw theirs.
VI. Manila Six Points (25 October 1966) as announced by GVN
- Cessation of aggression.
- Preservation of the territorial integrity of South Vietnam.
- Reunification of Vietnam.
- Resolution of internal problems.
- Removal of Allied Military Forces.
- Effective guarantees.
VII. U Thant's Three Points (20 April 1966)
- The cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam.
- The scaling down of all military activities by all sides in SVN.
- The willingness to enter into discussions with those who are actually fighting.
NOTE:
North Vietnam's four points were the subject of further comment by (a) NVN Premier Pham Van Dong in an interview with Harrison Salisbury carried in the 4 January 1967 issue of the New York Times and (b) NFN chief diplomatic representative in Western Europe, Mai Van Bo, in a talk to French and foreign correspondents in Paris on 5 January 1967.
Dong's statements are judged by State to be only minor variations on old North Vietnamese themes. Previous statements have suggested Hanoi has two preconditions for talks: (a) cessation of the bombing and (b) US willingness to talk to the NFL as an independent entity. Hanoi has never stated clearly that acceptance of the points is a pre-condition for talks. What Hanoi has said is that the Four Points are the only correct basis for settlement.
Bo's statement was that if the U.S. stopped the bombing "definitely and unconditionally;" the Hanoi Government would "examine and study" US proposals for negotiations. He further stated that the U.S. "could not hope for reciprocal action of any sort."
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