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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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II. B. 1.
THE INTERAGENCY DEBATE
OVER U.S. INTERVENTION IN INDOCHINA
TABLE OF CONTENTS AND OUTLINE
OVER U.S. INTERVENTION IN INDOCHINA
TABLE OF CONTENTS AND OUTLINE
| Page | |||
| 1. | The General Policy Context | B-5 | |
| a. | The Final Truman Program (NSC 124) | B-5 | |
| b. | Eisenhower Administration's "Basic National Security Policy" | B-5 | |
| 2. | The Question of Intervention with Ground Forces | B-5 | |
| a. | The Problem is Presented | B-5 | |
| b. | NSC: State and Defense Views | B-6 | |
| c. | The JCS View | B-7 | |
| d. | Formation of Special Working Group on Indochina | B-7 | |
| e. | Erskine Report, Part I: Motivate the French | B-8 | |
| f. | The Erskine Report, Part II: Intervention Only After Geneva? | B-8 | |
| g. | NSC 177 Annex Raises Intervention Question Anew | B-9 | |
| h. | Army Questions Feasibility of Air–Naval Intervention and Outlines Ground Forces Requirements | B-10 | |
| i. | Defense–JCS "Solution": Rectify French Deficiencies | B-11 | |
| 3. | The New Approach: "United Action" | B-11 | |
| a. | Presidential Decision to Support Only "United Action" | B-12 | |
| b. | Rejection of Unilateral Intervention | B-13 | |
B-4
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