Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
all whites in another "night of the long knives" similar to that of 1946.)
Now the French had been insistent that the National Army was a hollow shell, that its officers would refuse to fight...that morale was so bad the troops would desert rather than follow "bloody Diem."111
Lansdale implies Collins fell for this "propaganda" but he, Lansdale, did not.
On the cease-fire, Lansdale reports:
The French told Diem that if he tried to take over Sureté headquarters which was now included in the French zone, French troops would open fire on the Vietnamese Army. The US advised Diem to be patient, that the French were really being helpful by negotiating with the Binh Xuyen. The cease-fire limit was extended...Sizeable sums were being offered (by French) to Army officers and to sect leaders who were remaining loyal to Die, and to entice them into being at least neutral. Those who refused were subjected to character assassination attacks...112
- b. Ely and Collins' Decision: Diem Must Go
On April 7, Collins and Ely discussed Diem. Ely said Diem could be maintained only by overcoming enormous difficulties. After a full day of "soul-searching," Ely had been forced to conclude Diem had to go to preserve Vietnam for the free world. He would accept anyone but Diem as premier.113 Collins had been nearing a similar conclusion. On March 31 he told the State Department it was necessary to consider alternatives to Diem.114 A week later Collins cabled Dulles to insist Diem be removed. He recommended Tran Van Do (Diem's foreign minister who also resigned from the cabinet in March) or Dr. Quat as replacements.115
- c. Dulles' Indecision
Dulles replied as he had in December: he could not see how Diem's replacement would solve the sect problem for any successor worthy of US assistance would still have to contend with them. A change in premiers would damage US prestige throughout the Far East: the US would be charged with paying lip service to the cause of Asian nationalism, than abandoning a nationalist leader when pressured by "colonial interests." Plus pro-Diem congressional sentiment was a problem. The Mutual Security bill was under debate and Mansfield had made it clear that Congress would be reluctant to appropriate funds to a Vietnam without Diem. Despite these difficulties, Dulles eventually agreed to consider a change if Collins would personally come to Washington for consultation.116
