Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
irreversible, but if they remain unchecked, they will almost certainly in time cause the collapse of Diem's regime. We do not anticipate that this will occur within the period of this estimate. However, if Diem is not able to alter present trends and the situation deteriorates substantially, it is possible during the period of this estimate that the government will lose control over much of the countryside and a political crisis will ensue." (Ibid., p. 1)
The U.S. view of its policy in Vietnam could not yet be said to be "crisis management"; but a crisis was portended.
3. Contrasting DOD and State Appreciations
The August SNIE notwithstanding, however, subsequent analyses appearing in the Department of State and the Department of Defense disclosed differing views on the relative urgency of the threat to Diem from communist machination as opposed to simple rebellion. In general, Department of Defense papers tended to emphasize the threat from rural, communist-led insurgents, and to highlight relative military capabilities; Defense papers usually deprecated the significance or urgency of non-communist political dissent in South Vietnam. In contrast, analyses by the Department of State in Washington and Ambassador Durbrow in Saigon recognized, at least in principle, the importance of both the military threat posed by the VC, and the problems which stemmed from Diem's political insolvency. Department of Defense analyses, therefore, usually regarded proposals· by State or Saigon which aimed at pressuring Diem into a more enlightened domestic policy as being competitive with measures to improve internal security. The Pentagon and its field commands tended to regard military assistance to Diem as the key to the situation. Indeed, the Pentagon tended to oppose U.S. leverage on Diem because it might jeopardize his confidence in the U.S. and cooperation from him which was essential to improve his military posture.
The divergence in view sketched above emerges in several papers written not long after the 30 August 1960 SNIE. For example, alarmed by the ominous conclusion of the SNIE's Deputy Secretary of Defense Douglas asked ASD/ISA for comments and recommendations on how to remedy the "deteriorating situation in South Vietnam." As input for the reply, Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, OSO/OSD, one of Ngo Dinh Diem's earliest U.S. advisors, wrote a memorandum holding that:
"As noted by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, conditions in Vietnam are deteriorating. The key element in the situation is the activity of the Viet Cong. While criticism of Diem's government in metropolitan areas adds to his problems and interacts with Viet Cong plans, the Viet Cong remains the primary threat to security … " (Memo for Admiral E. J. O'Donnell,
