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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
| DATE | EVENT OR DOCUMENT | DESCRIPTION |
| 25 Oct 1961 | Saigon Message 536 |
Taylor reported the pervasive crisis of confidence and serious loss in Vietnamese national morale created by Laos and the flood, weakened the war effort. To cope with this Taylor recommended: Improvement of intelligence on the VC; building ARVN mobility; blocking infiltration into the highlands by organizing a border ranter force; introduction of U.S. forces either for emergency, short-term assistance, or for more substantial, long-term support (a flood relief plus military reserve task force). Diem had reacted favorably "on all points." |
| 1 Nov 1961 | BAGUIO Message 0005 | Taylor told the President, Rusk and McNamara "we should put in a task force (6–8,000 men) consisting largely of logistical troops for the purpose of participating in flood relief and at the same time of providing a U.S. military presence in Vietnam capable of assuring Diem of our readiness to join him in a military showdown with the Viet Cong…" |
| 1 Nov 1961 | BAGUIO 0006 EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT | Taylor concluded that the communist strategy of taking over Southeast Asia by guerrilla warfare was "well on the way to success in Vietnam"; he said the GVN was caught in interlocking circles" of bad tactics and bad administrative arrangements" which allow VC gains and invite a political crisis. He recommended more U.S. support for paramilitary groups and ARVN mobility; the MAAG should be reorganized and increased and the task force introduced to "conduct such combat operations as are necessary for self-defense and for the security of the area in which (it) is stationed," among other things. Taylor felt the disadvantages of deployment were outweighed by gains, said SVN is "not an ex- |
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TOP SECRET – Sensitive
