NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
Op-322NIE/hb
TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION
| Subj: | The Current Situation in French Indochina. |
| Annex: | (A) Military Forces French Indochina. |
1. The four year old military deadlock in Indochina has apparently been broken by the current Viet Minh offensive. This offensive action along the Sino-Tonkin border is forcing the French to withdraw to the Red River delta and is threatening the entire French position in northern Indochina. It now appears that the aid which Viet Minh have reportedly been receiving from the Chinese Communists over the past six months has been the deciding factor in breaking this stalemate in their favor.
2. The successful Viet Minh operations against Dong Kha on 15 September and more recently against the retreating French garrison from Cao Dang have revealed unexpected strength on the part of the Viet Minh. They have abandoned their former hit-and-run tactics and are now capable of conducting a coordinated offensive and in general of waging a conventional form of warfare. The French admit that the forces which recently wiped out almost all of the 4,000 French troops on the highway between Cao Bang and Langson, were equal to the French in equipment, training and technique. Important factors in the Viet Minh success have been excellent artillery support, accurate anti-aircraft fire and good intelligence.
3. The recent operations have revealed serious weakness in French manpower, leadership and intelligence. The French lack the mobile reserves need to engage in offensive operations or to counter the current Viet Minh thrust. This lack of reserves has become especially acute since the French lost the better part of seven battalions near Cao Bang during the week of 5 October 1950. Moreover the creation of a loyal Vietnamese National Army has not progressed sufficiently to release an adequate number of French forces for offensive operations. The French have been further handicapped by inadequate intelligence, resulting partly from a reluctance to fly reconnaissance missions over or near Chinese territory. Finally, the French have delayed in effecting necessary tactical withdrawals in time to prevent the garrisons of border ports from being overwhelmed by superior enemy forces.
4. The French High Command has now recognized the need to regroup its forces in anticipation of a sustained Viet Minh attack on Hanoi and Haiphong. This regrouping will make necessary the early evacuation of all border posts in N.E. Tonkin unless the recent French request for fifteen additional battalions from France is quickly granted. In this area, nine French battalions with a maximum strength or 7,200 men, are now facing approximately 13,000-14,000 Viet Minh regulars. Is is also doubtful that the N.W. Tonkin outposts can be held. There an estimated 5,000 French troops are surrounded by 4,000-5,000 Viet Minh forces.
5. French evacuation of the entire border area is likely to have certain serious consequences:
- (a) It would facilitate the build-up of logistic support need by the
