NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
SECRET
MEETING OF THE U.S. — FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTERS:
FIRST MEETING, WASHINGTON, SEPTEMBER 11, 1951,
3:30 p.m.
Extract from Minutes[1]
Indochina
1. M. SCHUMAN said that his Government was preparing a note on Indochina dealing with the present troop strength and casualties and containing a projection of plans and problems for 1952. Without going into details it was clear that it would be impossible for France to carry out the proposed effort in Indochina and to fulfill its obligations with respect to the defense of Europe. France planned to spend a billion francs a day in Indochina alone and faced many problems in obtaining a maximum effort there as it was engaged to do. As to the financial problem the Finance Ministers would be discussing it further. In brief, after July 1, 1952, the French would be unable to continue their effort at the present rate and would face a 150 billion franc deficit for the year. This deficit incidentally was included in the French estimate on the dollar gap. It was not suggested that the U.S. finance French policy directly but it was hoped that the U.S. could assist by arms and other troop supplies, especially in establishing the national armies of the Associated States. In this connection General de Lattre hoped to expand the present strength of 25, battalions to 50 battalions.
2. Mr. ACHESON said that M. Mayer, French Finance Minister, had discussed this matter with General Marshall and had made a deep impression upon him. The need for a solution was generally recognized. There was general agreement on the principle as discussed during the talks with M. Pleven, that France should continue to be primarily responsible for Indochina, that U.S. troops should not be used, and that first priority in military aid should go to Indochina. This difficult problem needed careful study, since funds directly available for Indochina under the present aid program were not sufficient. Both General Marshall and Mr. Foster of EGA were examining' all possible ways to find other routes to reach the common goal. All that could be
- ↑ Copy held in S/S–R. For JCS position opposing commitment in Indochina of US forces, "under such circumstances as overt Chinese Communist aggression", see memorandum of JCS to Marshall (Defense), Aug. 31, 1951, top secret.
TSECRET
