Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part V. B. 2. b.djvu/247

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D. C.

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SECURITY INFORMATION


3 March 1952


MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE


Subject: United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia.


1. In accordance with the request contained in your memorandum, dated 16 February 1952, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied NSC 124, a draft statement of United States policy on the above subject, and a staff study relating thereto, both prepared by the National Security Council Staff. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the proposed policies enunciated therein are set forth below.

2. NSC 124 recommends United States courses of action in the several areas of Southeast Asia. Taken either separately or together, acceptance of most of these courses of action and hence of NSC 124, involves the making of a single basic decision. This basic decision is whether or not the United States, in support of the objective of NSC 124 stated as "to prevent the countries of Southeast Asia from passing into the Communist orbit," would be WILLING to take military action which would, in effect, constitute war against Communist China. An affirmation at this time within the National Security Council of such a willingness does not necessarily involve taking a decision now whether or not to go to war in advance of the nature and extent of the aggression becoming apparent. On the other hand, affirmation of this willingness should be made with a clear understanding of the implications which the adoption of these courses of action would entail. In addition, such affirmation of this willingness is essential in order to provide the basis for determining:

a. The cost of these courses of action, in terms of men, money, and materiel;
b. The impact of these courses of action upon the economy of the United States;
c. The impact of these courses of action upon United States military assistance programs with particular reference to the inevitable reduction in the United States contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) effort; and
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