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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
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| to achieve internal security; assist army of the French Union against communist aggression; Korean events could cause diversion of aid from Associated States. Acheson 4 to Saigon, 1 July 1950 | 338 | |
| 129. | A summary of existing policy on Indochina reveals the JCS view on NSC 73 that the U.S. give consideration to providing air and naval assistance should the Chinese provide overt support to the Viet Minh. Consultants' Meeting, 25 July 1950 | 341 |
| 130. | The U.S. feels that French requests for overall assistance (military , economic, and political) are inadequate to "consummate U.S. broad objectives in Indochina" and assistance will have to be increased to resist encroachment of communism. Heath (Saigon) 170 to Acheson, 7 August 1950 | 343 |
| 131. | The U.S. views growing political and military deterioration in Indochina with concern; especially evident are failure of the government to gain support, disinclination of Bao Dai to assume leadership role, and indications of CHICOM-Viet Minh military collaboration. The U.S. seeks to have Vietnam establish a national army and declare a national emergency. Acheson 238 to Saigon, 1 September 1950 | 344 |
| 132. | The U.S. informs France that the U.S. was prepared to increase assistance to French Union forces but could not furnish money for local use or direct tactical air support. Extract of Summary Minutes of Tripartite, Foreign Ministers Meeting, France, U.K., and U.S., 14 September 1950 | 347 |
| 133. | The Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee (SEAC) proposes a statement of U.S. policy on Indochina to the NSC for consideration. "The U.S. will not commit any of its armed forces to the defense of Indochina against overt, foreign aggression.…" but should assist in the "formation of new national armies of the three Associated States." The U.S. should also "press the French" to carry out the agreements of 8 March 1949 and 30 December 1949. SEAC D–21, 11 October 1950 | 349 |
| 134. | "The draft statement of U.S. policy in Indochina is weak from the political side.…the Defense representatives argued for a strong, hardhitting policy on political and economic concessions. The State Department representatives flatly refused.…to consider Indochina in that manner. Consequently, the paper ended with a compromise." K. T. Young, DoD Office of Foreign Military Affairs, letter to General Malony, SEAC, 13 October 1950 | 369 |
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TOP SECRET - Sensitive
