NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
and immediate increase in the scale of United States production, and pending that increase , would reduce the military assistance programs to other nations, especially those in high priority.
17. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in paragraph 6? of the study in the Annex to NSC 124, which is quoted below for ready reference:
- "In order to pursue the military courses of action envisaged in this paper to a definite favorable conclusion within a reasonable period, it will be necessary to divert military strength from other areas thus reducing our military capabilities in those areas, with the recognized increased risks involved therein, or to increase our military forces in being, or both. The magnitude of the United States military requirements to carry out these courses of action and the manner in which they could best be met can be determined only after study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff."
Such determination will follow completion of the military studies called for in subparagraph 6c(3) of the draft policy statement in NSC 124 dealing with the military measures called for in subparagraphs 6d, 7f, 8c, 9b, and 10c thereof. In this connection, an armistice in Korea will not of itself permit major redeployment or redisposition of ground forces in the Far East in the near future except at the risk of losing Korea and endangering Japan in the event hostilities in that area are resumed.
18. In connection with the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff contemplate no employment of United States ground force units in French Indochina, Thailand, or Burma; rather the Joint Chiefs of Staff anticipate that the major increase in United States forces required for contemplated operations against aggression in that area would be naval and air force units. It should be noted that the creation of any new units would, in general, strengthen the United States military position for the eventuality of global war and that such forces would be capable of rapid redeployment in that eventuality.
19. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the United States military point of view, do not wish to join in a combined military command at this time or under present circumstances for the defense of Southeast Asia against Chinese Communist aggression. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the United States should not at this time contemplate relieving the French of their responsibility in Indochina if present United States global strategy, includ-
