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No. 1.]
REVIEWS OF BOOKS.
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and complicated and unsystematized a study as that of society or "sociology."

Since the centre of the book is found in the familiar conception of the organic nature of society, it may be noted that Mr. Mackenzie seems to fail entirely in his effort to set up the notion of a social organism as a tertium quid between the old and well-worn antitheses, monism and monadism. No monist would demur to a view of the world or of society as "a unity which expresses itself through difference" (p. 129), but in the two words "unity" and "difference" the old antithesis still lurks.

The book has an advantage resulting from the author's wide reading and frequent citations. By their aid it becomes a representative and exponent of a large and able school. One who wishes to know the books, especially the English books of recent years, that are valuable in the lines of the theory of the social sciences might find much help and guidance in the frequent references in foot-notes to the literature of the subject.

W. F. Willcox.
Mechanism and Personality: an Outline of Philosophy in the light of the latest Scientific Research. By Francis A. Shoup, D.D., Professor of Analytical Physics, University of the South. Boston: Ginn & Co. 1891. — pp. xiv, 343.


This book aims to set forth the present attitude of philosophy in a way suited to the comprehension of the ordinary reader. For this difficult task the author has several important qualifications. He has read widely and has a considerable power of clear exposition. He is abreast of the scientific thought of the day especially in his own department of physics, and yet believes that science has not taken and cannot take the place of metaphysics. And, best of all, he firmly believes in his conclusions and writes with vigor, because he is so sure of his ground. Whether those who have worked over his field for themselves agree with his results or not, they will hardly deny that it is best for the beginner in philosophy to be brought face to face with some coherent system of thought. First of all, let him assimilate this, and only when he has gained a complete and sympathetic mastery of some one system will he "be entitled to criticise and compare and dissent, until gradually is own belief on the vital problems shall be evoked from the disintegrating fragments of the system he has learned. And it will be admitted by many that, in choosing a system into which the beginner shall be inducted, none better in its temper and general results is to be found than the one for which our author vigorously fights, "that of Lotze, or perhaps better, the Lotzian phase of Kant." The key-note of the book