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istic theories which deny, or seem to deny, the existence of any such extra-conscious reality as is here spoken of. In truth, however, this is not so; for in any case this dualism seems to exist, and so, if not justified, it has to be explained away. Subjective idealism, accordingly, must have an epistemology of its own, even if it be only of a negatively critical character. For indeed no theory can deny the contrast between the present content of consciousness and that which it symbolizes or stands for. No theorist takes the particular mental state as independent and self-sufficient; he cannot avoid referring it beyond itself. But if he is a subjective idealist, say like Mill, he will try to avoid the acknowledgment that this reference of present consciousness beyond itself carries us beyond consciousness altogether. He will explain it as a reference of a particular mental state to a permanent law of connection between mental states, and thus convey the impression that the reality to which the subjective consciousness refers is still in a manner within that consciousness. This does not appear to me to be an adequate account of the facts, but what I am concerned to show just now is only that the epistemological question is not determined out of hand by the way in which it has been defined. The essential epistemological contrast is as fully recognized by Mill as any Realist could wish to see it. Take his own words in evidence: "The conception I form of the world existing at any moment, comprises, along with the sensations I am feeling, a countless variety of possibilities of sensation. . . . These various possibilities are the important thing to me in the world. My present sensations are generally of little importance, and are, moreover, fugitive; the possibilities, on the contrary, are permanent, which is the character that mainly distinguishes our idea of Substance or Matter from our notion of sensation." This reference of the "fugitive" content of consciousness to a "permanent," which is somehow beyond it (a reference which Mill admits and emphasizes), is just what we ordinarily mean by knowledge, and as such it constitutes the problem of epistemology. But the unavoidable acknowledgment of this contrast, of this reference, does not imply any decision as to the