Stoical and Christian. The short chapter on Contentment might be pondered with profit by the majority of grown-up men and women. The treatment of Self-respect, which he regards as the foundation of all true manliness and womanliness, is discerning and stimulating. I have space only to signalize besides the two chapters on Selfishness and the Home. As a whole, the work answers in a way at once intelligible and interesting to the young persons for whom it was intended, and to others too, the deepest question that can be asked, "What is the true life for individuals?" It will be strange indeed if readers are not made both wiser and better. In another edition the following corrections should be made: iii, l. 2, "XXIII" for "XX" and l. 4, "XXIV" for "XX"; p. 1, l. 6, "other" for "these"; p. 4, l. 9, "Politics" for "Political Economy"; p. 126, l. 22, "of" for "fo."
In a note to his "Geschichte der Ethik in der neueren Philosophie" Professor Jodl remarks, "I am not acquainted with any monograph upon the ethics of Locke." The present dissertation thus fills a niche hitherto unoccupied in the history of English ethics. The author begins with an historical sketch in which he points out that the "sensualism, materialism, and absolutism" of Hobbes "formed the point of departure of modern ethical speculation" (p. 8), and dwells interestingly on a neglected contemporary of Hobbes and forerunner of Cumberland, Nathaniel Culverwel.
After this introduction Professor Curtis comes to Locke and finds his position determined in great measure by reference to his great predecessor. "It remained for Locke to review the entire philosophy of Hobbes and assail it in each of its ethico-political strongholds. . . . They represent two distinct and opposing lines of thought not only in politics, but in morality and religion" (p. 18). "On the main lines Locke opposes Hobbes throughout, while agreements in particulars are the agreements of both with others who went before" (p. 22). This interpretation differs widely from those of Professor Jodl, "Locke agrees with Hobbes in his fundamental idea" (Grundanschaung) (G.d. Ethik, I, p. 146), and Professor Wundt, "Locke follows Hobbes in his fundamental ideas in that he opposes intellectualism" (Ethik, p. 275) as well as of Professor Paulsen, whose opinion the author cites and attempts to refute. Locke like Kant seems to have given rise to two lines of successors, each claiming to be the legitimate heirs of his intellectual
