the two cardinal and opposed principles of animal ethics must be observed ; and there must be "sacrifices, partial or complete, of some of the individuals" for the good of the species. "Such are the laws, by conformity to which a species is maintained; and if we assume that the preservation of a particular species is a desideratum, there arises in it an obligation to conform to these laws, which we may call, according to the case in question, quasi-ethical or ethical."
From this summary of the argument, it will appear that many ethical questions are raised in the course of it, and these, questions of large import; but it does not seem clear that anything which may be regarded as animal ethics is implied. The more closely the facts are scrutinized, the more obvious it becomes that we have not even the germs of ethical distinctions.
Three things need to be distinguished — references to animal conduct, allusions to human thought and feeling, and the metaphysical questions bearing on the government of the world. These three stand quite apart. Our main concern is with the first of them, animal conduct regarded as a lower stage in the line of advance leading forward to familiar aspects of moral life. No objection is offered to the relation in which the first part of the argument stands to the other parts. The later features may be considered before closing, but meanwhile we are mainly concerned with conduct natural to animals.
It will be readily granted that "there is a conduct proper to each species of animal," and also that such conduct is "the relatively good conduct." But any careful statement of what is meant will show that there is no ethical element involved. Conduct "proper to a species" is only such as the nature of the animal fits it for; such as that the sheep should seek grass, eat grass, flourish, and grow wool. This is the conduct proper to the sheep. So it belongs to the hawk to seek its prey, to dive swiftly and with precision, to eat with avidity, to rest on its perch; to the dog to hunt in the forest; to the horse to roam over the prairie in search of fodder. These are examples of conduct proper to species, that is, conduct for which animals are fitted by structure, appetites, and instinct, in fulfilment of
