pain as the original consciousness. This is soon differentiated into pain of excess and pain of lack with the evolution of pure pleasure. Will exists throughout as sequent of feeling. Much, indeed, is to be done before this theory of the nature of mind is either fully elucidated or completely proved, but I am persuaded that when we consider mind as a life function, we are led toward the doctrine maintained in the preceding pages. I am more and more convinced that sensationalism and intuitionalism are both mistaken as to the essence of mentality. Consciousness is not, at bottom, any mode of cognition, either as more or less freely accomplished by a "mind," or as more or less mechanical impression from things; but it is primitively and fundamentally pain and pleasure as serving the organism in the struggle for existence. It seems somewhat strange that evolutional psychologists have not generally set forth this theory, but almost without exception they are sensationalists. Horwicz is the only one whom I know to have made a survey of feeling as primitive and simple fact of mind in relation to self-conservation, but his discussion is mainly physiological and not the introspective induction and deduction which I have herein sketched.
LAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY.
