Psychology, seems more inclined to take Goldscheider's word for it; but even he does not think the case proven.[1] Even if we accept, for the sake of argument, the correctness of the facts as stated by Goldscheider, it seems to me highly probable that it will be necessary to reinterpret them, perhaps in accordance with the hypothesis I have above suggested in reference to argument 4, in terms of which they are, in my opinion, readily statable as follows: that the nerves in question and their terminal organs are those of the cutting-pricking sensation which always occurs in painful phase under the conditions involved in the methods adopted by experimenters.
So much for the direct favorable arguments. Dr. Nichols has brought forward two indirect arguments in favor of this view which must receive attention.
7. He shows that the sensational hypothesis enables us to understand the distribution of pains and pleasures by the additional hypothesis that there are few or no pain nerves where pleasure usually occurs and few or no pleasure nerves where pains are usual, this latter hypothesis being certainly warranted by our knowledge of the distribution of other nerve terminals. It is apparent, however, that this argument is not effective unless it can be shown that pleasure-pain distribution cannot be made comprehensible under any other hypothesis than the one he defends. That such is not the case I think I shall be able to show below.
8. The same objection may be made to the effectiveness of Dr. Nichols's argument from biology. He shows very cleverly that it is possible to sketch out a theory of biological development compatible with the sensational theory of Pleasure and Pain; but this does not establish his main thesis unless he can show that it is impossible to bring opposed Pleasure-Pain theories into line with our modern biological conceptions. I shall presently attempt to show that one counter-theory at least is compatible with our general notions of biological development.
- ↑ P. 512.
