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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.
[Vol. VI.

superiority, imposes on us a claim to serve him; and it is our duty to respond thereto. According as the superiority is worthier, so its claim is more stringent. The semi-personal forms of duty—whose object is a society or an institution—possess the same essential characteristics. In impersonal duty, we touch upon the central fact of ethical experience, where a moral agent acts in accordance with his moral ideal. Here we feel the claim of impersonal excellence. In fact, all duty is a kind of homage or devotion to excellence, whether actual in the external world, or ideal and created by the mind. This appreciation cannot in any proper sense be explained, but we can understand how fundamental it is by seeing its kinship to self-preservation and race-preservation. But the effort towards perfection cannot be 'reduced' to a mode of the struggle for existence. The historical method is a valuable help to explanation, but it is not an explanation by itself. The last aspect of duty is its effort and strain. Duty is essentially the service of an imperfect nature. Sometimes, however, we pass beyond constraint into the freedom of love unattended by sacrifice, and thus transcend the sphere of duty. These moments of freedom, though rare and quickly gone, still give us a vague anticipation of a more perfect state, where Duty vanishes in Love.

Albert Lefevre.
Moral Life of the Early Romans. Frank Granger. Int. J. E., VII, 3, pp. 281-301.

As compared with Greece, Rome has contributed to the content of our practical life rather than to its form, as systems of ethics prove. The Roman spirit still lives in our institutions and laws, both political and ecclesiastical. After the war with Hannibal, Rome was compelled to draw on the rural districts for wisdom, patriotism, frugality, and courage. The primitive life of the Romans was discernible in the reforms and religious ceremonies of Augustus, but could scarcely be recognized in the Stoicism of Marcus Aurelius, and was given new meaning in Christianity. Every act of the Roman was closely connected with his religion. If he departed from the custom of his ancestors, in whose memory he lived, his action was disapproved by the other members of the community. Family life was self-reverent and self-controlled, but the husband used the license accorded him by all slaveholding nations. Paternal authority and the even tenor of civil life braced the will, and the dissoluteness of Rome only made its appearance at a late date. Frugality was pushed to avarice. The debtor was made a slave, and at the caprice of his master crucified. Assassination was recognized as a party weapon. Citizenship was guarded against extension, and the stranger treated as an enemy. The senate was the bulwark of freedom, and potent in bringing the whole world under the rule of Rome. Scrupulous in his own conduct, the Roman was exacting in regard to others. Living by rule, he did not apply his principles to new spheres of conduct. Only power and wealth were objects of his respect. He lacked ideals, and it was