developed thought." These ideas, he claims, account for primitive doctrines of immortality, which latter beget the worship of ancestors. Whether or not this theory of Spencer's, or Coulange's theory that early ideas of generation and creation afford the clew to the mystery, satisfactorily accounts for this primitive practice, the fact nevertheless remains, that the deification of the dead is the oldest religion known to men, which religion is the efficient cause of ancient social organization, the essential principle of archaic institutions, archaic morals, and archaic laws.
As to what those institutions and laws were, a simple discussion of the scope of comparative jurisprudence does not afford opportunity for inquiry. That they were utterly different from those of our own day may, however, be said. It seems to us, regarding law by the light of reason alone, that it must be somewhat more than immemorial usage, that it should acknowledge the principle of amendment and growth, and that it is something separate and distinct from religion; and yet ancient societies had an entirely different notion of it, regarding it as the revelation of some deity, hallowed by custom, and absolutely immutable in its principles, being nothing less than "religion applied to the relations of men among themselves." And so it would seem, from the reason of the thing, that there must always have been a law of contract as known to us, yet society had become far advanced in civilization before any such law was recognized and formulated. It would seem that the individual must always have held property in his own right, must always have been at liberty to dispose of it by some method of alienation during his life, and prescribed by will or testament some disposition of it after his death; and yet individual property and rights of alienation and testamentary bequest are, so to speak, new-fangled notions. In the same way we have come to regard local contiguity as the only possible basis of common political action; nevertheless, it is but yesterday that our Western world outgrew the assumption that community of worship or of blood was the sole natural ground of community in political organization. In like manner, we have been taught to believe that the individual is the necessary unit of society, and yet in all archaic societies the family is the only conceivable unit. And so the theory of relationship recognized by or law is apparently the only one which right reason can suggest; yet that theory would have appeared strange and unnatural to an ancient Brahman, or a Roman judge at the time of the Twelve Tables. Thus, "in its leading characteristics," to quote Mr. Hearn, "political, legal, religious, economic, archaic society presents a complete contrast to that in which we live. There was in it no central government, and consequently there were no political organs. There was no law to make, there was none to be executed. There were neither parliaments, nor courts of justice, nor executive officers. There was no national Church. The great bulk of property, not only as to
