Page:Psychology of the Unconscious (1916).djvu/194

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PSYCHOLOGY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

countless manifestations of the Will in the sense of Schopenhauer. It is sufficiently comprehensive and rich in meaning to characterize the real nature of the psychical entity which it includes. The exact classical significance of the word libido qualifies it as an entirely appropriate term. Libido is taken in a very wide sense in Cicero:[27]

"(Volunt ex duobus opinatis) bonis (nasci) Libidinem et Lætitiam; ut sit lætitia præsentium bonorum: libido futurorum.—Lætitia autem et Libido in bonorum opinione versantur, cum Libido ad id, quod videtur bonum, illecta et inflammata rapiatur.—Natura enim omnes ea, quae bona videntur, sequuntur, fugiuntque contraria. Quamobrem simul objecta species cuiuspiam est, quod bonum videatur, ad id adipiscendum impellit ipsa natura. Id cum constanter prudenterque fit, ejusmodi appetitionem stoici [Greek: bou/lêsin] appellant, nos appellamus voluntatem; eam illi putant in solo esse sapiente, quam sic definiunt; voluntas est quæ quid cum ratione desiderat: quæ autem ratione adversa incitata est vehementius, ea libido est, vel cupiditas effrenata, quæ in omnibus stultis invenitur."^[1]

The meaning of libido here is "to wish," and in the stoical distinction of will, dissolute desire. Cicero[28] used "libido" in a corresponding sense:

↑ From the good proceed desire and joy—joy having reference to some present good, and desire to some future one—but joy and desire depend upon the opinion of good; as desire being inflamed and provoked is carried on eagerly toward what has the appearance of good, and joy is transported and exults on obtaining what was desired: for we naturally pursue those things that have the appearance of good, and avoid the contrary—wherefore as soon as anything that has the appearance of good presents itself, nature incites us to endeavor to obtain it. Now where this strong desire is consistent and founded on prudence, it is by the stoics called Bulesis and the name which we give it is volition, and this they allow to none but their wise men, and define it thus; volition is a reasonable desire; but whatever is incited too violently in opposition to reason, that is a lust or an unbridled desire which is discoverable in all fools.—The Tusculan Disputation, Cicero, page 403.

[1] From the good proceed desire and joy—joy having reference to some present good, and desire to some future one—but joy and desire depend upon the opinion of good; as desire being inflamed and provoked is carried on eagerly toward what has the appearance of good, and joy is transported and exults on obtaining what was desired: for we naturally pursue those things that have the appearance of good, and avoid the contrary—wherefore as soon as anything that has the appearance of good presents itself, nature incites us to endeavor to obtain it. Now where this strong desire is consistent and founded on prudence, it is by the stoics called Bulesis and the name which we give it is volition, and this they allow to none but their wise men, and define it thus; volition is a reasonable desire; but whatever is incited too violently in opposition to reason, that is a lust or an unbridled desire which is discoverable in all fools.—The Tusculan Disputation, Cicero, page 403.

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