Page:Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services.pdf/6

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907 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT

works on a.r.s. Erlich gained his access to the Internet through defendant Thomas Klemesrud’s (“Klemesrud’s”) BBS “support.com.” Klemesrud is the operator of the BBS, which is run out of his home and has approximately 500 paying users. Klemesrud’s BBS is not directly linked to the Internet, but gains its connection through the facilities of defendant Netcom On-Line Communications, Inc. (“Netcom”), one of the largest providers of Internet access in the United States.

After failing to convince Erlich to stop his postings, plaintiffs contacted defendants Klemesrud and Netcom. Klemesrud responded to plaintiffs’ demands that Erlich be kept off his system by asking plaintiffs to prove that they owned the copyrights to the works posted by Erlich. However, plaintiffs refused Klemesrud’s request as unreasonable. Netcom similarly refused plaintiffs’ request that Erlich not be allowed to gain access to the Internet through its system. Netcom contended that it would be impossible to prescreen Erlich’s postings and that to kick Erlich off the Internet meant kicking off the hundreds of users of Klemesrud’s BBS. Consequently, plaintiffs named Klemesrud and Netcom in their suit against Erlich, although only on the copyright infringement claims.[1]

On June 23, 1995, this court heard the parties’ arguments on eight motions, three of which relate to Netcom and Klemesrud and are discussed in this order: (1) Netcom’s motion for summary judgment; (2) Klemesrud’s motion for judgment on the pleadings;[2] and (3) plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction against Netcom and Klemesrud. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants in part and denies in part Netcom’s motion for summary judgment and Klemesrud’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and denies plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.

I. Netcom’s Motion for Summary Judgment of Noninfringement

A. Summary Judgment Standards

Because the court is looking beyond the pleadings in examining this motion, it will be treated as a motion for summary judgment rather than a motion to dismiss. Grove v. Mead School District, 753 F.2d 1528, 1532 (9th Cir.1985). Summary judgment is proper when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). There is a “genuine” issue of material fact only when there is sufficient evidence such that a reasonable juror could find for the party opposing the motion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511–12, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Entry of summary judgment is mandated against a party if, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, the party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The court, however, must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving parties, including questions of credibility and of the weight to be accorded particular evidence. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 520, 111 S.Ct. 2419, 2434–35, 115 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991).

B. Copyright Infringement

To establish a claim of copyright infringement, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) ownership of a valid copyright and (2) “copy-

  1. The First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) contains three claims: (1) copyright infringement of BPI’s published literary works against all defendants; (2) copyright infringement of RTC’s unpublished confidential works against all defendants; and (3) misappropriation of RTC’s trade secrets against defendant Erlich only.
  2. Klemesrud alternatively filed a motion for summary judgment, which will not be considered at this time because Klemesrud was unavailable to be deposed in time for plaintiffs’ opposition. In a previous order, the court struck those portions of the motion that referred to matters outside of the pleadings.