CHAPTER 45.
ARSON
§ 7382. Arson defined. Arson is the willful and malicious burning of a building, with intent to destroy it.
§ 7383. Building defined. Any house, edifice, structure, vessel or other erection, capable of affording shelter for human beings or appurtenant to or connected with an erection so adapted, is a "building," within the meaning of the last section.
§ 7384. Inhabitable' building defined. Any building is deemed an "inhabitable building," within the meaning of this chapter, any part of which has usually been occupied by any person lodging therein at night.
§ 7385. Night time defined. The words "night time," in this chapter include the period between sunset and sunrise.
§ 7386. Burning defined. To constitute a burning within the meaning of section 7382 it is not necessary that the building set on fire should be destroyed. It is sufficient that the fire is applied so as to take effect upon the substance of the building.
§ 7387. Ownership defined. To constitute arson it is not necessary that another person than the accused should have had ownership in the building set on fire. It is sufficient that at the time of the burning another person was rightfully in the possession of, or was actually occupying, such building or any part thereof.
§ 7388. Immaterial variance in proof. An omission to designate, or error in designating in an information or indictment for arson, the owner or occupant of a building, shall not prejudice the proceedings thereupon, if it appears that upon the whole description given of the building, it is sufficiently identified to enable the accused to prepare his defense.
§ 7389. Malice, when inferred. Malice sufficient to constitute arson is inferred from proof that the accused committed an act of burning a building, and that some other person was rightfully in possession of or actually occupying any part thereof. It is not necessary that the accused should have had actual knowledge of such possession or occupancy or should have intended to injure any person.
§ 7390. Burning without intent to destroy. But the burning of a building under circumstances which show beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no intent to destroy it, is not arson.
§ 7391. Contiguous buildings. When any appurtenance to any building is so situated with reference to such building, or when any building is so situated with reference to another building that the burning of one will manifestly endanger the other, a burning of the one is deemed a burning of the other, within the foregoing definition of arson, and as against any person actually participating in the original setting fire, as of the moment when the fire from tive one shall communicate to and burn the other.
§ 7392. Degrees of arson. Arson is distinguished into four degrees.
§ 7393. In first degree. Maliciously burning in the night time an inhabited building, in which there is at the time some human being, is arson in the first degree. 1302
