The very fact that the British Government claimed until the last moment that there was to be no political recognition of the Soviet Government shows how this aspect of the agreement was a defeat for Great Britain and a victory for the Soviets—a victory undoubtedly due, as Krassin claims, to the Bolshevist propaganda. Yet it was only a few weeks after the agreement had been signed that the British courts declared that it amounted to a de facto recognition, in spite of the fact that it is distinctly stated in that document that it was only preliminary to such recognition. A tremendous comment on this trade agreement is the fact that the Bolshevists apparently continued to expend the same vast sums of money in Great Britain for the overthrow of the British Government after that agreement as before. Apparently the Bolshevists put special hopes upon the coal strike (April and May, 1921). Although this was a purely economic struggle in the fundamental questions raised, a very considerable minority in the organization openly attempted to take advantage of the crisis for revolutionary purposes. In view of this fact the official statement made in the House of Commons by Edward Shortt, Secretary for Home Affairs, on May 12, is of the utmost significance:
The British Government is considering the possibility of introducing legislation to prohibit the receipt of foreign money in the United Kingdom intended to promote a revolutionary movement or to sustain a revolutionary propaganda.
If such agitation was indeed being carried on by the Bolshevists it was done with the encouragement of the British Government itself.
