While Risk Group 2 or 3 pathogens are unlikely to infect a city, they could still pose a substantial risk to the community. A blood supply infected with HIV, for example, or immunocompromised communities like nursing homes suddenly falling ill with tuberculosis, could spark a localized panic.
In addition, individuals can use even simple pathogens to great effect to harm a large population. For instance, in the 1984 Rajneeshee bioterror attack—the largest bioterror attack in U.S. history—attackers sickened more than 700 Oregonians by spreading salmonella they had purchased at a U.S. lab on a few local salad bars.[1] The pathogens found at the Reedley Biolab, such as the many different types of E. coli strains or a potentially antibiotic-resistant strain of Tuberculosis, could be used to an even deadlier effect.
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Figure 39 – Congressional record discussing the Rajneeshee bioterror attack.
The Reedley Biolab also presented an ongoing transmissibility risk to the wider community. The Reedley Biolab’s precautions, if any, fell well below the standard of care for facilities containing these types of diseases. This in turn means that any worker there—including the workers forced to care for the transgenic mice that, per the other employees’ own statements, were infected with diseases like COVID-19—could become a vector for a pathogenic outbreak within the community. In addition to respiratory-based pathogens, there are ongoing risks that a worker could suffer infection from blood-based pathogens through cuts or
- ↑ Scott Keyes, A Strange but True Tale of Voter Fraud and Bioterrorism, The Atlantic (June 10, 2014).
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