opinion, is thine uncertainty, and thou reproachest to us, that faith is a vulgar credulity.
But I ask, on what side here is credulity? Is it on that of the freethinker or the believer? The latter believes in a future state, on the authority of the divine writings, that is to say, the book, without contradiction, which most deserves belief; on the deposition of holy men, that is to say, just, pure, and miraculous characters, who have shed their blood to render glory to the truth, and to that doctrine of which the conversion of the universe has rendered a testimony that to the end of ages shall rise up against the impious; on the accomplishment of the prophecies, that is to say, the only character of truth which the impostor cannot imitate; on the tradition of all ages, that is to say, on facts which, since the creation of the world, have appeared certain to all the greatest characters, the most acknowledged just men, the wisest, and most civilized nations the universe could ever boast of: in a word, on proofs at least probable. The freethinker denies a futurity on a simple doubt, a mere suspicion. Who knows it? says he; who has returned from it? He has no argument, either solid or decisive, to overturn the truth of a future state. For let him avow it, and then will we submit. He only mistrusts that there be any thing after this life, and upon that he believes that all dies with him.
Now I demand, which here is the credulous? Is it he, who, in support of his belief, has whatever is probable among men, and most calculated to make impression on reason; or he who is resolved to deny a future state on the weakness of a simple doubt? Nevertheless, the freethinker imagines that he exerts his reason more than the believer: he looks down upon us as weak and credulous men; and he considers himself as a superior genius, exalted above all vulgar prejudices, and whom reason' alone, and not the public opinion, determines. O God! how terrible art thou when thou deliverest up a sinner to his own infatuation! and how well thou knowest to draw glory to thyself even from the efforts which thine enemies make to oppose it.
But I go still farther: when, even in the doubt, formed by the unbeliever, of a future state, the arguments should be equal, and the trifling uncertainties, which render him incredulous, should balance the solid and evident truths which promise immortality to us; I say, that even in an equality of proofs, he at least ought to wish that the opinion of faith, with regard to the nature of our soul, were true; an opinion which is so honourable to man; which tells him that his origin is celestial and his hopes eternal; he ought to wish that the doctrine of impiety were false; a doctrine so melancholy, so humiliating to man; which confounds him with the beast; which makes him live only for the body; gives him neither purpose, destination, nor hope; and limits his lot to a small number of rapid, restless, and sorrowful days, which he passes on the earth. All things equal, a reason born with any degree of elevation would prefer being deceived by what is honourable to itself rather than adopt a side so disgraceful to its being. What a soul,
