an opponent, to become entitled to destroy him; to bear, with impatience, the authority of a father, or the severity of a master, to embrue your hands in their blood: in a word, you have only to bear within you the impressions of every vice, to be permitted the gratification of all; and, as each finds the fatal seeds in himself, none would be exempted from this horrible privilege. It is necessary, therefore, that man conduct himself by other laws than his inclinations, and another rule than his desires.
Even the Pagan ages acknowledged the necessity of a philosophy, that is to say, of a light superior to the senses, which regulated their practice, and made reason a check to the human passions.
Nature alone led them to this truth, and taught them that blind instinct ought not to be the sole guide of the actions of men: this instinct therefore, either is not the original institution of nature, or it must be a corruption of it, since all the laws ever framed on earth have avowedly been made to restrain it, — that all those who, in every age, have borne the character of wise and virtuous, have rejected its impressions, — that, amongst all nations, those infamous individuals who yielded themselves up without reserve or shame to brutal sensuality, have been always considered as monsters, and the disgrace of humanity, — and, the maxim once established, that our inclinations and desires cannot be considered as crimes, society can no longer exist; men must separate to be in safety, must bury themselves in the forests, and live solitary like the beasts.
Besides, let us render justice to men, or rather to the Author who has formed us. If we find within us inclinations to vice and voluptuousness, do we not also find sentiments of virtue, modesty, and innocence? If the law of the, members drag us toward the pleasures of the senses, do we not also bear, written in our hearts, another law, which recalls us to chastity and temperance? Now, between these two tendencies, why does the freethinker decide that the inclination which impels us toward the senses is most conformable to the nature of man? Is it from being the most violent? But its violence alone is a proof of its disorder; and whatever proceeds from nature ought to be made moderate. Is it from being the strongest? But there are just and believing souls in whom it it is always subject to reason. Is it from being more agreeable? But a sure proof that this pleasure is not made to render man happy, is, that disgust immediately follows it; and likewise that, to the good, virtue has a thousand times more charms than vice. Lastly, is it from being more worthy of man? You dare not say so, since it is through it that he confounds himself with the beast. Why, then, do you decide in favour of the senses, against reason, and insist, that it is more conformable to man to live like the beast than to be a reasonable being?
Lastly, were all men corrupted, and, like the animals, not gifted with reason; did they blindly yield themselves up to their brutal instinct, and to the empire of the senses and passions, — you, then, perhaps, might have reason to say that these are inclinations inseparable from nature, and in example find a sort of excuse for your
