in the fullest latitude, yet the customary law of Europe is against the exercise of this power of confiscation of debts; in support of which position, they rely on what is added by Vattel, p. 484. Let us examine what he says: — ^ The sovereign has naturally the same right over what his subjects may be indebted to enemies: therefore he may confiscate debts of this nature, if the term of payment happen in the time of war, or at least he may prohibit his subjects from paying while the war lasts. But at present, in regard to the advantage and safety of commerce, all tJie sovereigns of Europe have departed from this rigour. And as this custom has generally been received, he who should act contrary to it, ivoidd injure the public faith; for strangers tnisted his subjects only, from a firm persuasion, that the general custom would be observed.^ Excellent man! and excel- lent sentiments! The principle cannot be denied to be good; but when you apply it to the case before the court, does it warrant their conclusions? The author says, that although a nation has a right to confiscate debts due by its people to an enemy, yet, at present, the cus- tom of Europe is contrary. It is not enough for this author to tell us that this custom is contrary to the nght He admits the right. Let us see whether this custom has existence here. Vattel, having spoken of the necessary law of nations, which is immutable, and the obligations whereof are indispensable, proceeds to distinguish the several other kinds of natural law in the same preliminary discourse, p. 11 and \2, thus:
^ Certain maxims and customs consecrated by long use, and observed by nations, between each other, as a kind of law, form this customary laiv of nations, or the custom of nations. This law is founded on a tacit con- sent, or if you will, on a tacit convention of the nations
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