"return" given by Gen. Butterfield, 10,177. Why did not Dr. Bates take the ratio of decrease from this corps? This would have given him a result much nearer the truth.
In the absence of the Federal official reports, it may not be proper to offer any explanation of the discrepancy between the numbers given by Butterfield and Doubleday for the strength of the First corps; but it seems evident, if Gen. Doubleday is correct, that some transfer of troops must have taken place between June 10th and July 1st; or that some part of the corps must have been elsewhere on detached duty.
falls into the error of Dr. Bates in assuming that the Federal reports of "strength" always included the sick and the teamsters, &c., while the Confederate did not. If Gen. Meade did not mean that his army present for duty numbered 95,000 he would have said so. I do not think there is an officer in either of the American armies who would understand his statement in the connection in which it was given in any other sense, and Dr. Bates must show some evidence to the contrary if he wishes his conclusions accepted. The specifications on the "returns" usually show what is included in the strength of armies, and generally the connection, if not direct statement, shows whether the numbers refer to the "present for duty," or to the "whole number borne upon the rolls," as Dr. Bates has it. In the civil war the officers on both sides had been trained in the same school, and their reports made in the same way. Frequently the Confederate reports included more than the effective fighting men. Thus 'Rodes' "return" at Carlisle, a few days before Gettysburg, makes his total strength of officers and enlisted men, "8,052." Now, Rhodes had about 6,000 muskets, or less than 7,000 effectives. The remainder were the detailed men—many of them disabled soldiers, but all "enlisted" men—who filled the places of teamsters, clerks, &c. There were no employees in the Confederate army—all such places being filled by details from the ranks.
