them.—T. B. R.], would not unfrequently occupy one side of the works and our men the other. . . . The flags of two opposing regiments would meet on the opposite side of the same works and would be flaunted by their respective bearers in each others faces. Men were bayoneted across the works; and officers with their swords fought hand to hand with men with their bayonets."
The same writer, in reference to the action generally, says:
"The battle of Atlanta was a warfare of giants. In the impetuosity, splendid abandon and reckless disregard of danger, with which the Rebel masses rushed against our lines of fire, of iron and of cold steel, there had been no parallel during the war."
This is the movement in which it is charged and reiterated by General Hood, in the face of the refutation contained between the covers of his own book, that Hardee failed to turn the enemy's flank.
This is the detour, with its fierce assault upon McPherson's flank and rear, as to which—because Hardee did not move "to or beyond Decatur" to strike and turn a flank which was on his line of march five miles southwest of Decatur—it is charged that Hardee was too timid to swing away from the army.
These are the soldiers to whom, on this field and in this action, General Hood attributes "lack of spirit" (191).
And this is the action, with its imperishable record of heroism and devotion, attested in the blood of the flower of Hardee's corps, which is passed over in a few grudging sentences (181), to be classed with the failures due to a "timid defensive policy" (183).
28th July, 1864.
On the 28th of July Hardee's corps was still occupying the position and ground which it had conquered on the 22d. Stewart's and Lee's corps (formerly Cheatham's) were on the opposite side of Atlanta; and there occurred the engagement which is correctly classed as one of the four battles around Atlanta.
General Hood refers to the operations of this day in the text (194) and in his official report (322) as defensive in character, and to the engagement which ensued as accidental, rather than preconcerted. In the text at page 194, he says:
"Lieutenant-General Lee was instructed to move out with his corps upon the Lick Skillet road, and to take the position most advantageous to prevent or delay the extension of the enemy's right flank. This officer promptly obeyed orders, and came unex-
