Military Operations of General Beauregard. 4 1 ]
tively barren. The victors, it is asserted, had no means of transpor- tation, and hardly any rations on hand. Therefore the enemy was not pursued and no forward movement made towards Washington. Could this deficiency have been provided for? If it could, and was not, whose fault was it ? We deem it a side issue which, with several others arising from the circumstances of this battle, cannot be al- lowed to occupy the space they would require within the scope of this necessarily concise and limited review.
Before and during the battle, Johnston was apprehensive of the appearance of Patterson on the field. Hence the logical inference that, in his opinion, there was nothing in the way to arrest and check the adversary, to whom he had given the slip. If this had happened, it is probable that there would have been a repetition of something like the Blucher afifair at Waterloo. But here a question may pre- sent itself to the mind of the reader of Colonel Roman's book. If, after the battle of Manassas, the combined forces of Generals John- ston and Beauregard could not march immediately and directly to Washington, on account of the want of means of transportation, rations, etc., and on account of other obstacles, could not a portion at least of the original plan, conceived by Beauregard, and rejected by Davis, Lee, and Cooper, have been executed ? McDowell was "crushed," not, it is true, according to that " brilliant and exhaustive plan"; but was he not sufficiently crushed to have permitted John- ston's troops, who had come in a few hours to Manassas, to return swiftly to their former position by the same conveyances, and, with Beauregard's supplemental forces, to destroy Patterson and enter Maryland ? All that our army wanted — means of transportation, abundant subsistence, ammunition, and all sorts of equipment — would have been found in Patterson's camp and in that well-disposed State, and perhaps reinforcements in men. Could not, in that direction, Washington have been more easily reached than by the straight and front route from Manassas ? This movement having not been exe- cuted by such men as Johnston and Beauregard, it must be supposed that it was really impossible.
It has been since ascertained that General Patterson and the twenty thousand men under his command were in a state of utter demoraliza- tion ; that the term of enlistment for most of them had expired, or was near expiring, and that they were anxious to go home. Besides, General Patterson had large planting interests in Louisiana. He was reported to be secretly opposed to the war, and only apparently hos- tile to the South from the force of circumstances. Be it as it may, a
