Opinion of the Court
(b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U. S. 333, 343 (1977).
Respondents do not contest that SFFA satisfies the three-part test for organizational standing articulated in Hunt, and like the courts below, we find no basis in the record to conclude otherwise. See 980 F. 3d, at 182–184; 397 F. Supp. 3d, at 183–184; No. 1:14–cv–954 (MDNC, Sept. 29, 2018), App. D to Pet. for Cert. in No. 21–707, pp. 237–245 (2018 DC Opinion). Respondents instead argue that SFFA was not a “genuine ‘membership organization’ ” when it filed suit, and thus that it could not invoke the doctrine of organizational standing in the first place. Brief for University Respondents in No. 21–707, at 24. According to respondents, our decision in Hunt established that groups qualify as genuine membership organizations only if they are controlled and funded by their members. And because SFFA’s members did neither at the time this litigation commenced, respondents’ argument goes, SFFA could not represent its members for purposes of Article III standing. Brief for University Respondents in No. 21–707, at 24 (citing Hunt, 432 U. S., at 343).
Hunt involved the Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, a state agency whose purpose was to protect the local apple industry. The Commission brought suit challenging a North Carolina statute that imposed a labeling requirement on containers of apples sold in that State. The Commission argued that it had standing to challenge the requirement on behalf of Washington’s apple industry. See id., at 336–341. We recognized, however, that as a state agency, “the Commission [wa]s not a traditional voluntary membership organization…, for it ha[d] no members at all.” Id., at 342. As a result, we could not easily apply the three-part test for organizational standing, which asks
