Opinion of the Court
missions programs “must have reasonable durational limits” and that their “deviation from the norm of equal treatment” must be “a temporary matter.” 539 U. S., at 342. The Court also disclaimed “[e]nshrining a permanent justification for racial preferences.” Ibid. Yet the justification for race-based admissions that the dissent latches on to is just that—unceasing.
The principal dissent’s reliance on Fisher II is similarly mistaken. There, by a 4-to-3 vote, the Court upheld a “sui generis” race-based admissions program used by the University of Texas, 579 U. S., at 377, whose “goal” it was to enroll a “critical mass” of certain minority students, Fisher I, 570 U. S., at 297. But neither Harvard nor UNC claims to be using the critical mass concept—indeed, the universities admit they do not even know what it means. See 1 App. in No. 21–707, at 402 (“[N]o one has directed anybody to achieve a critical mass, and I’m not even sure we would know what it is.” (testimony of UNC administrator)); 3 App. in No. 20–1199, at 1137–1138 (similar testimony from Harvard administrator).
Fisher II also recognized the “enduring challenge” that race-based admissions systems place on “the constitutional promise of equal treatment.” 579 U. S., at 388. The Court thus reaffirmed the “continuing obligation” of universities “to satisfy the burden of strict scrutiny.” Id., at 379. To drive the point home, Fisher II limited itself just as Grutter had—in duration. The Court stressed that its decision did “not necessarily mean the University may rely on the same policy” going forward. 579 U. S., at 388 (emphasis added); see also Fisher I, 570 U. S., at 313 (recognizing that “Grutter … approved the plan at issue upon concluding that it … was limited in time”). And the Court openly acknowl-
