Page:Students for Fair Admissions v. President and Fellows of Harvard College.pdf/71

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Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)
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Thomas, J., concurring

all racial classifications to the strictest of scrutiny.” Jenkins, 515 U. S., at 121 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also ante, at 15, n. 4 (emphasizing the consequences of an insufficiently searching inquiry). And, in case after case, we have employed strict scrutiny vigorously to reject various forms of racial discrimination as unconstitutional. See Fisher I, 570 U. S., at 317–318 (Thomas, J., concurring). The Court today rightly upholds that tradition and acknowledges the consequences that have flowed from Grutter’s contrary approach.

Three aspects of today’s decision warrant comment: First, to satisfy strict scrutiny, universities must be able to establish an actual link between racial discrimination and educational benefits. Second, those engaged in racial discrimination do not deserve deference with respect to their reasons for discriminating. Third, attempts to remedy past governmental discrimination must be closely tailored to address that particular past governmental discrimination.

A

To satisfy strict scrutiny, universities must be able to establish a compelling reason to racially discriminate. Grutter recognized “only one” interest sufficiently compelling to justify race-conscious admissions programs: the “educational benefits of a diverse student body.” 539 U. S., at 328,


    (2003) (“We have explained that discrimination that violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment committed by an institution that accepts federal funds also constitutes a violation of Title VI”); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 287 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (“Title VI … proscribe[s] only those racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause”). As Justice Gorsuch points out, the language of Title VI makes no allowance for racial considerations in university admissions. See post, at 2–3 (concurring opinion). Though I continue to adhere to my view in Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 1–54), I agree with Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence in this case. The plain text of Title VI reinforces the colorblind view of the Fourteenth Amendment.