570 U. S., at 311. Respondents’ second proffered end point—when students receive the educational benefits of diversity—fares no better. As explained, it is unclear how a court is supposed to determine if or when such goals would be adequately met. Third, respondents suggest the 25-year expectation in Grutter means that race-based preferences must be allowed to continue until at least 2028. The Court’s statement in Grutter, however, reflected only that Court’s expectation that race-based preferences would, by 2028, be unnecessary in the context of racial diversity on college campuses. Finally, respondents argue that the frequent reviews they conduct to determine whether racial preferences are still necessary obviates the need for an end point. But Grutter never suggested that periodic review can make unconstitutional conduct constitutional. Pp. 29–34.
(f) Because Harvard’s and UNC’s admissions programs lack sufficiently focused and measurable objectives warranting the use of race, unavoidably employ race in a negative manner, involve racial stereotyping, and lack meaningful end points, those admissions programs cannot be reconciled with the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause. At the same time, nothing prohibits universities from considering an applicant’s discussion of how race affected the applicant’s life, so long as that discussion is concretely tied to a quality of character or unique ability that the particular applicant can contribute to the university. Many universities have for too long wrongly concluded that the touchstone of an individual’s identity is not challenges bested, skills built, or lessons learned, but the color of their skin. This Nation’s constitutional history does not tolerate that choice. Pp. 39–40.
No. 20–1199, 980 F. 3d 157; No. 21–707, 567 F. Supp. 3d 580, reversed.
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Thomas,
Alito,
Gorsuch,
Kavanaugh, and
Barrett, JJ., joined.
Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion.
Gorsuch, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which
Thomas, J., joined.
Kavanaugh, J., filed a concurring opinion.
Sotomayor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Kagan, J., joined, and in which
Jackson, J., joined as it applies to No. 21–707.
Jackson, J., filed a dissenting opinion in No. 21–707, in which
Sotomayor and
Kagan, JJ., joined.
Jackson, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case in No. 20–1199.
