(c) To shelter troops that are to keep down the hostile fire by their own delivered from enfilading or commanding positions;
(d) To maintain a strip of ground or a supporting point that has just been gained, whether this has been captured from the enemy or whether the attack has come to a standstill at that point and a pause in the fighting occurs.
4. An attack with the aid of the spade from trench to trench is advisable only in exceptional cases, when the attack is a purely frontal one and is made over ground devoid of cover.
12. THE EMPLOYMENT OF RESERVES.[1]
(Pars. 294, 295, 366, 388, 393, 427 and 436 German I. D. R.).
The infantry attack may be characterized as a fire fight. It would seem desirable to surround the enemy's zone of approach, or the position one wishes to attack, from the very outset with a dense, continuous line of rifles, and to overcome the resistance of the enemy in the earliest phases of the combat by means of an overwhelming volume of fire from as many rifles as possible. The impediments that stand in the way of carrying out this idea lie in the terrain, the ignorance of the enemy's position, and in human nature. The defender can be driven from his position only by an attack; the impulse for an advance must be given by fresh troops; and the success gained by the firing line must be clinched by a retained assaulting force. The necessity of having a formed body of troops available, until the fight is in full swing, to meet unforeseen contingencies, further requires that a reserve be provided. Organizations should not be broken up any more than is absolutely necessary. The number of troops which the commander will retain for the time being, will depend upon the amount of
- ↑ Taktik, V. p. 334, et seq.
