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still bring about the decision, or avert a defeat, but it will never produce decisive results.

A counter-attack made after the attacker has penetrated into the position, and while he is endeavoring to dislodge the garrisons of such supporting points as still offer resistance, reckons with the fact that the hitherto victorious assailant, exhausted and in confusion, will not be a match for a well aimed blow delivered by a considerable number of troops. However, a defender will scarcely contemplate such an employment of his general reserve; for him the important thing is to repulse the attack in front of and not within the position. Although military history presents comparatively numerous instances of such retours offensifs, this may be explained by the fact that the counter-attack was launched too late. The weakness of the assailant is but momentary, and the most must be made of this by advancing against him promptly by the shortest line. But if the assailant has had time to re-form and to bring up his batteries, it will usually be too late to make a counter-attack.


Aymard's Division (French), which had penetrated into Servigny under cover of darkness, but had made no attempt to occupy the town systematically or to re-form the disordered troops, was driven out again by a counter-attack made by only eleven Prussian companies.[1]

The numerous counter-attacks made by the French during the battle of Wörth (for example the counter-attack made by Maire's Brigade) pushed too far forward into the zone of the German artillery fire, and did not have the expected success. The well-led French counter-attack made by about 1200 men from the south edge of the Niederwald, was discontinued at a timely moment.[2] The well-directed counter-attack made by the 1st Turco Regiment at Wörth, after the capture of Elsaszhausen, was successful and is especially instructive.[3] The attack made by General de Sonis for the purpose of retaking Loigny was undertaken too late and with inadequate forces.[4] The same is true of the counter-attack made by the 3rd Bavarian Division on Zella (4th July, 1866).

  1. Kunz, Noisseville, p. 52. Das Wald und Ortsgefecht, p. 181.
  2. Kunz, Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele, XIII, pp. 75 and 159.
  3. Ibid., XVI, p. 187, et seq.
  4. Hönig, Volkskrieg, IV, p. 124.