The rallying position should be occupied in time, so that all dispositions for holding it can be made calmly and without precipitation. A powerful fire at mid and long ranges is requisite to prevent the enemy from reaching decisive ranges. The firing line should, therefore, be strong and the supports weak. If a reserve is still available, it is at once sent back into a second rallying position, to cover the withdrawal of the troops occupying the first rallying position. A free field of fire down to the shortest ranges is not necessary. If the position is on elevated ground, the firing line should be posted so far in rear of the crest that, while its fire can still sweep the ground at mid ranges, and perhaps at the extreme limit of short ranges, the skirmishers, on retiring, will be sheltered as soon as possible. Fire should be opened as soon as possible, in order to retard the enemy's advance.
The troops holding a rallying position should delay the enemy's advance long enough to give the retiring force ample time and room to re-form, so that it can effect its retreat in good order. When this has been accomplished, the troops occupying the rallying position retire, unless there is hope that fresh troops may bring about a change in the state of affairs. As a rule, a second rallying position will be necessary, but it would be a mistake to halt in every seemingly favorable position. When a retreat has once been decided upon, it is generally necessary to get away from the enemy as quickly as possible.
"The commander must conduct the combat attending a retreat according to a well-ordered plan. He must indicate where the rallying position is to be, what troops are to occupy it, and assign march directions to the different columns. Only after he has given these orders and has assured himself that they will be executed, does he leave the battlefield, in order to meet his troops soon thereafter with new orders.[1] The rest is the business of subordinate leaders."
- ↑ This sentence in our regulations, not to be found in those of other armies, was necessary to absolve a superior commander from all blame for leaving his troops and the battlefield. v. Schlichting, I, p. 115. See Taktik, V, p. 350.
