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258 CHANCERY m. N. W. of Richmond, where it was separated into six. One struck the James River canal, and made an ineffectual attempt to destroy the aqueduct across the Rivanna river ; one rode to within two miles of Richmond, passing clear through the outer defences, and destroying a railroad station ; four others tore up a few rails on the Fredericksburg railroad, which was the main purpose of the expedition, but doing so little injury that in three days the trains were again running. The scattered bodies at length made their way back, cross- ing the Rappahannock May 8. CHANCERY. By this term is designated the English system of equity, which in a modified form has been introduced into the United States. The name, according to Coke, was de- rived a cancellando, because it was the office of the chancellor to cancel letters patent of the king which had been improvidently issued. Others, as Spelman and Cowell, suppose that it originated a cancelli*, that is, lattice work, by which the crowd was shut off, an etymology which is supported by the analogous case of the title of the legal profession in England and this country, which is taken from the bar or railing by which practising lawyers were en- closed and separated from other attendants in court. The system which the name designates is as peculiar as its title. There are several theories as to the mode in which this branch of jurisprudence has been developed. One is that it was a usurpation by the chancellors, who were at an early period ecclesiastics, and hostile to the spirit of the common law. This was maintained by Sir Edward Coke, who while chief justice of the king's bench vigorously resisted the attempt of the lord chancellor Ellesmere to give relief against a judgment in the king's bench, which had been notoriously , obtained by fraud. The parties and their soli- citors and counsel were indicted for questioning the judgment; but the matter having been brought before the king, he decided in favor of the courts of equity, but putting his decision merely upon an arbitary discretion, which he claimed as his prerogative. The jurisdiction of actions by the court of chancery took its rise from a device of ecclesiastical chancellors to evade the statutes of mortmain, that is to say, statutes prohibiting the grant of lands to religious houses. Instead of a grant of the lands directly to the parties thus disabled to take, the practice was introduced of making a grant to a person who was under no disability, but for the use of religious corporations or per- sons ; and in chancery it was held that the use was binding in conscience, and could be en- forced. It was for the purpose of getting ju- risdiction of this class of cases that John Wal- tham, chancellor of Richard II., adopted the subpoena, which has ever since been the pro- cess for commencing a suit in equity. To un- derstand the nature of this innovation, it is necessary to bear in mind that all writs for the commencement of suits in the different courts, though issued from the office of the chancellor, which was called officina justitice, were re- turnable not to the office from which issued, but to the courts where such suits were to be prosecuted. But the chancellor claimed to have authority from something contained in one of the statutes to compel parties to appear in chancery and answer in respect to a use. So far there is some color for the charge of usurpation of authority for ecclesiastical ad- vantage ; but when by act of parliament, passed shortly afterward, uses were made subject to the statutes of mortmain the same as the lands themselves, the doctrine of the court was found to be beneficial otherwise as a relief from restraints upon the alienation of property which had long existed. In the reigns of Henry IV. and V. the commons attempted unsuccess- fully to suppress the writ of subpoena, the object of which was to take away the juris- diction of the court of chancery ; and in tho reign of Edward IV. it had become the regular practice of the court to entertain actions com- menced by that process. The statute of uses, 27 Henry VIII., by which uses were executed, that is to say, transferred into possession, seemed likely to oust the chancellor of his new jurisdiction, as the courts of common law thereupon took cognizance of a use as being the real ownership of land ; but by a narrow construction of the law, by which only one use was recognized, the court of chancery was enabled to regain its power. Thus a convey- ance to A, for the use of B, in trust for C, was held to be a use executed in B, and the trust for remained and might be enforced in equity. Gradually the jurisdiction of the court was extended to a great variety of other cases, some of which were cognizable by common law courts. For the most part, however, its province was to give relief when the forms or rules of the common law could give none. Common instances of this were afforded in the case of penalties and forfeitures. At com- mon law, the penalty of a bond was deemed the debt upon non-performance of the condi- tion, and judgment was recovered accordingly; but in chancery the amount really due was considered to be the debt, and on tender there- of with costs of suit at any time before judg- ment a fltay of proceedings was granted. So as to mortgage : at common law the land was forfeited upon non-payment of the debt when due ; but in chancery relief was given upon subsequent payment or tender of the real debt. The same doctrine was extended to pledges, and to other personal contracts subject to a penalty or involving a forfeiture. In many of these cases the rules of law gradually conform- ed to equitable principles; as for instance, a judgment upon a bond, although nominally for the penalty, could be enforced only for the amount really due; and so mortgaged lands could not be retained after tender of the real debt, and this led to the process of filing a bill in chancery by the mortgagee in order to