Page:The American Cyclopædia (1879) Volume IX.djvu/283

INFANTRY 271 for marching looks very much like the Ameri- can under the same circumstances. His over- coat is made into a long slender roll and hung on the left shoulder, the two ends coming to- gether, and being fastened on the right hip. His haversack of coarse white linen, and glass canteen covered with leather, are slung from the right shoulder. Around the flask are buckled two broad straps, used in peace to cover the sights of the gun. He wears no shoulder belt, but a pipe-clayed waist belt, on which are slipped two cartridge boxes of black leather, carried on either side, each box holding 20 car- tridges. The knapsack is of calfskin, tanned with the hair on, and is slung by two pipe- clayed leather belts. The knapsack is made to keep its shape by a light. wooden frame. On each end outside is a deep box in which is car- ried a case of 20 cartridges. On top of his knapsack is strapped a galvanized iron pot, holding about three quarts, with a tight-fitting cover, which is used separately for cooking. He wears on his waist belt a strong sword 15 in. long, which can be used for defence or for cutting wood or material for fascines and gabions. His gun is unburnished, so that it may not attract attention by flashing in the sun, and is pretty well coated with grease. He carries no blanket. A leather pouch for money is hung around the neck, and also a zinc plate attached to a card on which are engraved the soldier's regiment, company, and number. The whole weight of arms and equipments is 50 Ibs. The tactics used by the German infan- try through the war of 1870 was an adaptation of the French tactics of the Napoleonic period. The ordonnance was issued in 1847 by the predecessor and brother of the present em- peror; but certain modifications have been made, from the experience of the late war, which are embodied in the royal Prussian or- der dated March 19, 1873. (See article by Capt. Branckenburg in "United Service Magazine" for 1873, No. 74.) The Prussian system is now, or probably will be, the model for the rest of the world. The general theory is that every means must be adopted to increase the effect of fire on the enemy's troops and to diminish that effect on our own. The tactical formation up to a recent period had been based upon the fire of the Napoleonic era. This for the in- fantry was slow and very inaccurate, effective up to 200 or at most 250 yards ; artillery firo was effective up to about 1,500 yards, but shell power comparatively feeble, the greatest ef- fect being really within the case zone of 500 to 200 yards, before effective infantry fire was reached. Under these conditions we see French troops attacking in such formations as that of Macdonald's column at Wagram, con- sisting of three divisions, one of which had its battalions deployed in one great column, the others being in contiguous columns of battal- ions on the flanks; or as D'Erlon's columns at Waterloo, four divisions, each advancing in column on a front of a deployed battalion ; or 431 VOL. ix. 18 as Ney's right column at Friedland, with a front of some 66 files and a depth of 80 ranks. The British troops used the line formation, at times two deep and at times four deep, in which latter formation both the guards and the 52d regiment moved at Waterloo to repulse the last attack of the French imperial guard. Passing through the skirmishers, who ran in, they ad- vanced over the comparatively short distance which separated the contending bodies of troops, and fired upon the enemy. The attack of Longstreet's corps on the left flank of the Union army at Gettysburg is also a case in point. Such a system of tactics would be utter suicide with the weapons of to-day; and the column of attack, which has played so famous a part in modern military history, may be said to belong to the past as completely as the Mace- donian phalanx or the wooden line-of-battle ships. The Prussians now employ a system of opening engagements with heavy fire of artil- lery, then attacking with a cloud of skirmish- ers, who take advantage of every hollow in the ground, tree, fence, &c., followed by columns to supply gaps. This shooting line no longer merely covers the fighting line as before, but it is the fighting line. Fed by small bodies suc- cessively brought up in extended order, their places as supports being taken by fresh bodies drawn from the rear, the fighting line may be brought to great strength. Little by little it is fed by troops not in close formation ; little by little it works its way up close to the enemy ; and by this feeding system of the shooting line a superiority of infantry fire is established, and the enemy's troops are demoralized. When the final attack is made, this shooting line has become much stronger, for whole battalions may have been absorbed. It is a line, but not a rigid one, depending on conditions of ground, and one which has worked its way to this point in small bodies in fighting order, without that fearful loss and consequent demoralization which must inevitably attend the advance of a rigid line of anything like its strength. Then comes the final attack, the rush of this re6n- forced line, this fighting division closely fol- lowed by the nearest supports. The Prussian instructions thus describe it : " If the enemy's line appears to be shaken in its holding of any part of its position, the shooting line, with the nearest but hitherto concealed supports, rush forward in quick, concentrated assault on this point ; while these draw together in close division, it must be the officers' endeavor to get them quickly in hand, in order to be able to resist the enemy's counter-attack. In the mean while, the divisions in rear follow up quickly." This system of fighting requires great intelligence, individual judgment, and at the same time thorough discipline and subor- dination on the part of the private soldier. It is secured in Prussia by the compulsory sys- tem of education, and by the elaborate character of the military training which every soldier is obliged to undergo. Kmsia. The Russian